INTRODUCTION
A refugee who gives a small amount of money to a "terrorist group," 1 or performs cooking or laundry services involuntarily 2 -whether or not the United States supports the group's goals-automatically becomes trapped in a material support web. The socalled "material support bar" is one of the grounds for inadmissibility to the United States named in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA" or "the Act"). 3 It has the potential to exclude otherwise eligible non-citizens from asylum, permanent residency, naturalization, and many other forms of immigration relief. 4 Although the purpose of the bar is to exclude persons who actively support terrorist groups by providing material aid, in reality the bar excludes far more-leaving victims of terrorist groups, asylum seekers seeking relief inside the United States, and recognized refugees outside of the country 5 promised resettlement in the United * The term "cruel distinctions" has its origins in a New York Times editorial discussing material support. While the article was published prior to the Secretary of Homeland Security's April 27, 2007, Exercise of Authority, the term "cruel distinctions" still fittingly describes the result-even with an additional waiver category. See Editorial, Shutting Out Terrorism's Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, at A22 (criticizing the first set of material support waivers: "the administration recently agreed to consider selective waivers of the material support ban. But the waivers would apply only if the groups doing the intimidating were not on any of the State Department's lists of terrorist organizations. That is a cruel and irrelevant distinction. Duress is duress, no matter which group coerced the cooperation."). ** The author would like to thank Professor Andrea McArdle for her support and enthusiasm for this piece. She would also like to thank Brent and Nancy Schusheim for their support given throughout law school as well as her best friend Daniel P. Dec. at 946 (suggesting that the Respondent might be eligible for deferral of removal under the United Nation's Convention Against Torture ("CAT")). 5 The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") distinguishes the term "asylee" (or "asylum seekers") and "refugees." The distinction is minimal-asylees apply for asylum status from within the United States; refugees apply for asylum status from abroad. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1157 with 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42). See also Press Release, who had provided material support to named groups of terrorists.
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At first blush, the waivers would appear to be a much welcomed change for refugees and their advocates; however, they provide only a slender reed for refugees to rely upon. Only a legislative fix that addresses the indiscriminate nature of the material support issue will keep genuine refugees out of its web. As of 2007 , there are an estimated 7,000 cases on hold for material support reasons; the waiver will likely apply to only ten to twenty of those cases.
12 This Comment will help explain the discrepancy between those figures by illustrating how the waivers (also known as "exemptions") are designed to keep the number of refugees admitted to a minimum. It will briefly present the tangled statutory history and language leading up to the current material support bar. This history is helpful in understanding the bar's expansive reach and the tensions immigration advocates have faced trying to curb its reach. The Comment will then use the facts from the cases of three applicants previously found ineligible for immigration benefits under material support provisions, In re S-K-, 13 Choub v. Gonzales, 14 and Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft 15 to demonstrate the absurd and arbitrary nature of the exemptions.
I. MATERIAL SUPPORT: A WIDE BAR TO ASYLUM
The first part of this section explains the history of the material support provision in the INA. The second part demonstrates that the material support provision's impact is due in part to its broad applicability to benign acts of support to designated terrorist groups.
A. Background
The statutory changes to the INA's material support provision are largely undefined, in spite of advocacy groups' efforts to define it. This lack of specificity has contributed to a narrow interpretation of the material support provision that ignores the circumstances of the asylum seeker's request.
The passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") in 1996, 16 the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, 17 and the REAL ID Act in 2005, 18 changed the material support provisions in the INA. Its former simple prohibition of material support to an organization engaged in a "terrorist activity" was transformed into a complex provision with a heavy burden on the asylum seeker to disprove the alleged support. 19 Each legislative act added more language to the provision and included a multi-tiered system that defined the term "foreign terrorist organization." 20 However, despite its length, it failed to define other key terms, most notably the term "material support."
Thus, for years, the major non-governmental actors in the asylum field, including Human Rights First, 21 Amnesty International, and the American Immigration Lawyers Association, 22 The coalition envisioned the piecemeal adjudication of the duress exemption only as a short-term solution.
26
Many non-governmental organizations also advocated for a de minimis exception, whereby refugees otherwise eligible for asylum who gave minimal or insignificant support, such as water, bread, or an invitation to a purely religious ceremony, 27 would not be excluded from asylum protection. 28 They asserted that to interpret "material support" as constituting any support would, in effect, nulistration to develop a legal interpretation of "material support" in line with a "common sense reading" of the statute). 23 A duress exception would provide a defense analogous to the well-established duress defense in criminal law. Duress is a recognized defense to a number of legal offenses, such as a crime, tort and contractual breach. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 426 (8th ed. 2005). The Georgetown University Law Center, in its fact-finding report on the application of the material support bar, contrasted the lack of a duress exception to material support with the use of a duress defense in criminal law: "[i]n the criminal context, an individual forced to give money or goods to an armed group would be considered a victim of criminal extortion, not a participant in the crime under U. In applying Article 1F of the 1951 Convention, a balance must be struck between the nature of the alleged offense by the applicant and the degree of persecution feared. The notion of balancing is inherent in the fundamental rights character of non-refoulement and in the cautious language of the Convention itself. Article 1F requires the decision maker to exclude the applicant only if he or she has "serious reasons for considering" that the non-citizen falls under one of the three exclusion clauses. 1951 Convention, art. 1, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. In practical terms, it requires an inclusion analysis (a determination on whether the applicant meets the refugee definition criteria) to occur before exclusion. A decision maker must first determine whether a person has a well-founded fear of persecution and then determine whether the crime is so grave that it is necessary to exclude him or her.
of the detention of enemy combatants at Guantánamo Bay. 38 The court rejected the UNHCR assertion "which indicates that materiality must be assessed in conjunction with the alien's claim of persecution and the question whether or not the alien presents a present or future danger to the security of the United States."
39
The BIA's interim decision stated, "[w]e are unaware of any legislative history which indicates a limitation on the definition of the term 'material support [,] ' " 40 and the court read the statute as not requiring intent to provide support. The BIA added in a footnote, "[i]t is also well established that Congress may enact statutes that conflict with international law." 41 In short, the BIA's adherence to a literal reading of the statute trumped international law and precluded consideration of the international convention's intent/ causal connection requirement.
Thus, in effect, the material support provision erected a bar to admission that would be difficult to remove, in part because of the statutory-construction based reasoning. This bar has led to cruel and pernicious results. For many refugees and asylum seekers, it means that the very circumstances that form the basis for their claims of persecution are used against them to deny protection.
B. The Material Support Maze
The remarkably broad language of the material support bar results in a convoluted maze, trapping refugees in its corridor and then blocking relief at every turn. Entering the maze, the bar includes a list of items that constitute material support-but this list is non-exhaustive. Section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) bars "[the provision of] a safe house, transportation, communication, funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training." 42 The BIA has suggested that 38 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (finding the U.S. military commissions violated Article III of the Geneva Convention); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1890) (stating that, "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction"). 39 In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 944 ("We thus reject the respondent's [UNHCR] assertion that there must be a link between the provision of material support to a terrorist organization and the intended use by that recipient organization of the assistance to further a terrorist activity."). 40 Id. at 943. 41 See, e.g., id. at 942, n.7. 42 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2006). material support was "intended to have an expanded reach and cover virtually all forms of assistance." 43 The Third Circuit has followed suit, expanding upon the enumerated statutory list to include handing out food and setting up tents at a religious congregation that was attended by militants along with regular members from the community. 44 By this logic, "mere support" or even "tangential support" can replace "material support."
There are many paths leading into the maze but the provider-recipient relationship is a compelling example. The current application of the material support bar is so broad that it applies to refugees who "gave support" by mere affiliation or relation to a known or unknown member of a terrorist group. This has included, for example, refugees who lived in or traveled to areas controlled by non-governmental, armed groups in order to receive schooling or for work opportunities. 45 It includes children who give support, 46 even if the child is obeying the orders of a parent or guardian affiliated with a terrorist group. 47 It also includes adults who, in their youth, provided support to a terrorist group or member.
48
The provider-recipient relationship, like the type and form of material support, is also defined broadly under the statute. Section 212(a)(3)(B) provides three categories of provider-recipient material support. 49 The provider establishes the first category by giving any type of support-monetary, domestic, religious, emotionalthat may have "helped" (albeit in some remote way) to further the recipient's commission of a terrorist activity.
50
The second category 51 is more vague and extends to any individual the alien "knows, or reasonably should know, has committed 43 In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 945. 44 47 The Harvard clinic documented an eleven-year-old daughter of a Karen National Union soldier who drew water for soldiers and her family in 1995. See PRELIMI-NARY FINDINGS, supra note 70, at 9. 48 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(bb), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(bb) (2006) . 49 Id. 50 Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(aa). 51 Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(bb).
or plans to commit a terrorist activity." 52 Here, the language of the statute encompasses the provider's past, present, and future contributions, 53 as well as the recipient's past, present, and future terrorist activity. 54 Thus, an applicant may have unwittingly given a campaign contribution to a group in the past that is implicated in terrorist activity years later. The language "reasonably should know" precludes instances where an alien intended the support to be used for peaceful means. As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 55 for instance, a monetary contribution intended for "nonviolent humanitarian" purposes constitutes material support since the donor has no ultimate control over how the funds are used. 56 Furthermore, the recipient need not belong to a terrorist organization but only to have been linked to a terrorist activity.
57
Since the benefit does not have to be linked to a terrorist activity, remote affiliation with a terrorist member will implicate this ground for inadmissibility.
58 Consequently, those who have "cooperated" with terrorist organizations or members in order to flee a conflict area have been found inadmissible under this ground. 59 The third provider-recipient category 60 is the catch-all category covering any support given to any "terrorist organization," defined broadly as "a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which en- 52 Id. 53 PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, supra note 70, at 4 (noting that no consideration is given to the temporal aspect of the contribution). 54 72 For advocates who struggled to make the United States uphold its 1951 Convention treaty obligation to protect refugees, the Secretary's announcement seemed like a step in the right direction. However, the exemption applied only to a small group of refugees-those who gave material support to a Tier III (or undesignated) terrorist organization 73 "under duress." Thus, the broad material support bar starkly contrasted with the narrow applicability of the issued waivers. The first section will explore the narrow applicability of material support waivers and exemptions offered by the DHS. The second section highlights the lack of clear procedures for asylum seekers to obtain a duress-based waiver.
A. A Narrow Waiver to the Material Support Bar
The INA defines Tier III organizations broadly as "a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, [terrorist] activities."
74 Yet most refugees seeking a waiver gave support to Tier I or II organizations. 75 Tier I organizations include groups designated terrorist 70 See, e.g., REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (2007) . See also ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED, supra note 21, at 1 ("The definitions of [material support and terrorist organizations] are so exceedingly broad that the bar is, tragically, affecting refugees who do not support terrorism at all."); MATERIAL SUPPORT PROBLEM, supra note 9 ("Ironically, for many of these refugees, the very circumstances that form the basis of their refugee or asylum claim have been interpreted in a way that has made them ineligible for refugee or asylum status in the United States."); PRELIMINARY FINDINGS supra note 59; UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 23. 71 76 There are currently forty-two designated groups on this list, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE"), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ("FARC"), and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army ("CPP/NPA").
77
Associational links to these groups alone account for the largest groups of refugees currently affected by the material support bar.
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In addition to the duress exemption, the Secretary declared that the material support provision would no longer bar applicants who provided material support to one of eight specific Tier III terrorist organizations. 79 This second category of waivers, what the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") calls "group-based exemptions," unlike the "duress exemption" category, applies to applicants who provided support to one of the eight listed organizations "regardless of whether the support was provided under duress. (2008) "an assessment related to national security and foreign policy interests," 81 his policy rationale seemed to have more to do with limiting the number of refugees admitted into the country than with national security concerns. 82 For advocates, this raised more questions than answers. 83 Why did the waiver apply to refugees who gave material support to Tier III organizations but not to similarly situated refugees who gave support to Tier I and II organizations? Why was duress required for material support given to "Tier III" terrorist organizations generally but not for the eight specifically named organizations? How and when could asylum seekers and refugees apply for a waiver?
On April 27, 2007, only two months after his first pronouncement, Secretary Chertoff exercised his authority once again by opening up the waiver to Tier I and II organizations. 84 The pronouncement expanded the exemption to all categories of terrorist organizations and used the exact same language as the first Exercise of Authority. 85 Like its Tier III predecessor, the waivers of support to Tier I and II organizations appeared generous, considering that only a year before there was no waiver of any sort. However, nearly a year after their issuance, the waivers have failed to have a substantive impact.
Under the former incarnation of the material support bar, the DHS put hundreds of affirmative asylum applications on hold, detaining legitimate asylum seekers and separating families. 86 In Feb- 
B. Duress-exemption Waivers Present No Clear Procedures
It is likely that otherwise eligible asylum seekers waiting in detention facilities on material support grounds 89 will have difficulty accessing waivers because there is no clear mechanism available for requesting a waiver. In HQ has been in discussion with DHS, ICE, etc. to figure out options for getting EOIR cases from the immigration judges to CIS to consider the waiver, but there are many options and models being discussed and no decision has been made. 90 Initially, the USCIS issued two memorandums on processing cases involving material support, but neither memo indicates how material support cases will be referred from the immigration courts to the USCIS. 91 In March 2008, the USCIS directed adjudicators to withhold adjudication of cases that may be eligible for the Secretary's exemptions, 92 but this memo included few details about refugee access to the review process. Similarly, otherwise eligible refugees slated for resettlement in the United States have limited access to an administrative review process. Thus, since the advent of the material support bar, the UNHCR, the international organization mandated with facilitating the resettlement of refugees around the world to safe third countries, 93 has "simply stopped referring [resettlement] cases to the United States." 94 While the memos do not clarify how asylum seekers and refugees can access waiver review, they do make a half-hearted attempt to flesh out the criteria for determining waiver applicability. 95 To direct the USCIS in its implementation of the waivers, the DHS provided the USCIS with four criteria. First, the applicant must be "seeking a benefit of protection under the Act and [must have] been determined to be otherwise eligible for the benefit of protection."
96 Like the INA's "material support"-its statutory counterpart 97 -this memo does not define its key term, "otherwise eligible," leaving it unclear as to whether applicants who are already in removal proceedings would be considered otherwise eligible.
98 Second, the refugee must also pass certain background and security checks.
99 These "relevant" checks are not named or otherwise referenced 100 and the lack of guidance may give the USCIS a blank check to deny refugee protection. Third, the refugee must have fully disclosed the nature and circumstances of each provision of material support and fourth, pose no danger to the United States.
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The Department of Homeland Security has also provided the USCIS with a host of "duress-related" factors 102 to "inform" its gate- This effectively diminishes access to the waiver for the number of refugees whose experience of duress stems from association-such as an imputed political opinion, ethnicity, or membership in a particular social group-instead of by a direct or targeted threat. 108 Additionally, the individual officer may consider "the severity and type of harm inflicted or threatened and, to whom the harm was directed." 109 However, the Secretary has yet to provide guidance for determining when harm or a threat rises to a level of inducing duress.
DHS did not stop there, however. It provided another set of factors for the USCIS to use when weighing the totality of circumstances for duress-based exemptions. 110 The officer may consider the "amount, type and frequency of the material support provided, the nature of the activities committed by the terrorist organization, the alien's awareness of those activities, the length of time since material support was provided, the alien's conduct since that time, and any other relevant factors." At the time those cases were decided, there were no waivers available. Nevertheless, so few material support cases exist not because most refugees fall outside of the material support bar's wide sweep, but, rather, because so many refugees fall within it. 115 Otherwise eligible asylum seekers wait in vain in detention facilities on material support grounds. 116 It is unlikely that they have heard of the waivers and, even if they have representation on the outside advocating on their behalf, there is no clear mechanism available for requesting a waiver.
In light of the criteria and factors discussed in the previous section, all three appellate decisions-Choub v. Gonzales, 117 SingKaur v. Ashcroft, 118 and In re S-K-119 -which originally denied asylum and withholding of removal relief to the applicants, would likely be deemed to be ARBITRARY IF THE CURRENT WAIVER PROVI-SIONS WERE APPLIED TODAY.
A. In re S-K-
The administration has failed to create procedures to deal with the many waiver-eligible cases in removal proceedings, 120 such as the case of Ma San Kwye.
121 Ma San Kwye was barred from asylum and withholding of removal by an immigration judge in 2005 for having contributed $1,100 Singapore dollars over an eleven month period to the Chin National Front ("CNF").
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San Kwye came to the United States from Burma to flee persecution and torture for her religious and ethnic-minority membership as a Christian Chin. As noted by the BIA, the Burmese government (a military dictatorship controlled by Burma's largest ethnic group) regularly commits human rights abuses against people of San Kwye's ethnic and religious background. 123 Indeed, San Kwye's family had been tormented by the Burmese military: the military arrested and detained her brother and killed her fiancé.
124
In 2001, following her fiancé's murder, San Kwye became acquainted with one of her late fiancé's friends, who was an undercover agent with the CNF.
125
The CNF, a known organization in Burma that advocates for democracy and freedom of ethnic Chin people, pledges to use force only in self-defense, and is allied with the National League of Democracy, which both the United Nations and United States have recognized as the legitimate representative of the Burmese people. 126 Understandably, given her family's suffering, San Kwye wanted to support the CNF's goals to secure freedom for the ethnic Chin and democracy for Burma. She donated money to the organization over the course of an eleven-month period and on one occasion provided her late fiancé's friend with a camera and binoculars.
127 These items were ultimately confiscated by the Burmese military, which also unearthed a letter written by San Kwye to the friend. 128 Following a raid on San Kwye's home, the friend strongly advised her to flee Burma as soon as possible, warning her that the Burmese military will torture anyone associated with a known member of the CNF and confirming for San Kwye that the military would know that she had provided the camera and binoculars. 129 At the time of the raid, San Kwye was working in Singapore. 130 Once her temporary work visa expired, however, she knew that her only option was to flee to a new country and ask for refuge.
131
Since San Kwye's denial of relief, the Secretary of Homeland Security has included the CNF on its group-based waiver list. The Attorney General added that his action in no way affects the precedential nature of the Board's conclusions in its earlier decision with respect to "the applicability and interpretation of the material support provisions in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) of the Act." 134 The courts can only provide limited relief because the material support bar prevents the adjudicators from providing relief to refugees who should be eligible without a waiver by the executive. The material bar forces the refugee's determination into the arbitrary and political waiver process.
In the BIA's original decision, it repeatedly stressed in several footnotes that San Kwye should be eligible for a waiver. 135 The con- 131 Id. 1, 2007) . 134 Id. at 291. 135 The court stated:
[W]e do tend to agree with the D.H.S.'s assertion during oral argument that the new waiver provisions apply to this case . . . we believe it unlikely that Congress intended to create a gap in which there would be no waiver available for asylum cases pending prior to the effective date of the REAL ID Act. In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 941 n.4; see also id. at 942 n.6 ("We note that the ultimate outcome of the respondent's case is still undetermined in light of her ability to apply for a waiver.").
[W]hile the Immigration Judges and the Board do not have the authority to grant the respondent or similarly situated aliens discretionary waiver, other officials, including the Secretary of State, prior to the instigation of removal proceedings, or the Secretary of Homeland Security, at any time upon consultations with other agency officials; have been granted this power. We find no reason to assume they will not act consistently with our international treaty obligations in exercising their power to grant such a waiver. Id. at 943 n.7; id. at 946 n.14 ("D.H.S. also indicated that once granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, the respondent may be eligible for a . . . [waiver] .").
curring opinion explained this point poignantly:
We are finding that a Christian member of the ethnic Chin minority in Burma, who clearly has a well-founded fear of being persecuted by one of the more repressive governments in the world, one that the United States Government views as illegitimate, is ineligible to avail herself for asylum despite posing no threat to the security of this country . . . I suggest that DHS may consider this respondent as someone to whom the grant of such a waiver is appropriate.
136
At the time of the BIA's initial decision, San Kwye clearly qualified for asylum; 137 nevertheless, it is unclear whether she would satisfy the "threshold requirements" in light of the waiver criteria. Specifically, under the waiver, the applicant must have passed security checks.
138
She may face obstacles under the second requirement, that she pass security checks. "The administration will not issue any Tier I and Tier II waivers until it has completed an intelligence assessment of the group." 139 The administration claims that this assessment is needed to help the adjudicators understand the group's general practices and better assess the refugee or asylum seeker's claim of duress. 140 This explanation holds little weight though as, under a group-based determination, which requires the same security assessment, discretionary authority is available regardless of whether the support was provided under duress.
141
Almost a year and a half after the BIA urged the Administration to use its waiver authority to grant San Kwye relief, a year after Secretary of State Rice issued a waiver for Chin refugees from Burma, and nine months after Secretary Chertoff announced the Tier III waiver, 142 San Kwye still had not been granted a waiver. Meanwhile, the situation in Burma has become increasingly violent. As Tom Malinowski, Advocacy Director of Human Rights 136 Id. at 947 (Osuna, Acting Vice Chairman, concurring). 137 Id. at 937 (stating "the Immigration Judge found that the respondent had established a well-founded fear of persecution in order to qualify for asylum"). 138 See USCIS Memorandum, May, supra note 80, at 3-4. The remaining criteria are: the applicant must (a) be eligible for protection, (b) have "fully disclosed, in all relevant applications and interviews with U.S. Government representatives and agents, the nature and circumstances of each provision of such material support," and (c) pose no danger to the security of the United States. But the interpretation of material support provision remained and, indeed, was confirmed by the BIA. Notably the BIA stated that the decision was based on the Secretary's and congressional action-not a re-interpretation of the material support. 145 Thus, its initial assertion "which set out parameters for addressing the material support bar for asylum and withholding of removal" remained law. 146 The material support bar would continue to be applied broadly.
B. Choub v. Gonzales
Choub v. Gonzales was decided on August 14, 2007, roughly six months after Secretary Chertoff announced the group-based and duress waivers. However, since he had been placed in removal proceedings prior to issuance of the waivers on October 21, 2002, Choub did not have the benefit of the waivers. 147 Like San Kwye, Samnang Choub was denied asylum and withholding of removal, but found eligible for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). 148 Deferral of removal under CAT is a subsidiary form of relief reserved for individuals who would likely be subject to torture, but who are nevertheless ineligible for withholding of removal. 149 A less desirable form of relief, deferral of removal under CAT can be terminated more easily than withholding of removal and does not protect the beneficiary from being detained by the DHS. 150 The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the BIA's finding that Samnang's activities-"supplying information to Cambodian Freedom Fighters ("CFF") about the Cambodian government's plans to arrest CFF members and about the strength of Cambodia military in certain areas" 151 -constituted material support. Samnang never denied providing information to Cambodian Freedom Fighters ("CFF") but did assert that during immigration court proceedings, "[w]hen, how, and to exactly whom he provided this information, and what if any possible effects this information had upon the operation were not asked [of him]." 152 Interestingly, the answer to these questions are all now highly relevant for the purposes of the waiver, as discussed further below.
The Ninth Circuit categorized CFF as a Tier III terrorist organization, briefly noting that "the group has undertaken activities . . . in an effort to overthrow the Cambodian government." 153 Since CFF is not one of the eight organizations under the group-based exemptions, Samnang's only possibility for relief would be the duress-exemption waiver. However, Choub's case is lacking one key fact: duress.
Samnang did not experience duress; rather, when a friend told him about CFF and its goals of freedom and democracy, he voluntarily joined the organization. 154 He states that he was not involved with the mission to overthrow the Cambodian government, but, nonetheless, politically supported CFF's efforts to free Cambodia from its totalitarian regime. 155 Moreover, Samnang would never be able to meet the elements of asylum if the latter were not true.
Had CFF been on the administration's list of group-based exemptions, Samnang would not have had to show duress. 156 It is unclear why Secretary Rice would issue a group-based waiver for individuals who had provided material support to the CNF, but not for individuals who supported the CFF given the groups' democratic goals. The Secretary's decision highlights how refugees are subject to an arbitrary process to be eligible for group based exemptions. Even the Ninth Circuit drew on the parallel between these organizations in its decision, but ultimately found it unpersuasive. The court stated, "The fact that [Samnang] Choub and the CFF claim to be motivated by their desire to advance democracy in Cambodia is immaterial" and then cited language from In re S-K-discussing the CNF: "Congress intentionally drafted the terrorist bars . . . to include even those people described as 'freedom fighters. . . ."
157 Indeed, had Samnang provided the same assistance to the CNF, he would be eligible for a waiver and able to attain refugee status. This incongruity demonstrates that the breath of the bar coupled with the exemption process leads to the arbitrary exclusion of eligible refugees.
Samnang, an otherwise eligible refugee, 158 would clearly be unable to demonstrate duress and, therefore, has no waiver possibility. Putting the official criteria for waiver aside for a moment, is Samnang really the kind of individual the United States should want to exclude? Samnang wants to help bring democracy to his country, which is currently run by a government with an abysmal human rights record.
159 CFF, his membership organization, is an anti-communist organization with the mission of bringing peace to Cambodia. 160 Ironically, CFF is a registered Californian non-profit organization. 161 The administration's piecemeal and random selection of organizations is yet another cruel and illogical distinction embedded in the material support bar, and Samnang is yet another victim.
C. Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft.
Refugees from India are the second largest group affected by the material support bar. 162 The vast numbers of people affected by conflicts, such as the attack on Golden Temple, and the complex nature of these conflicts have caused a large number of Indian refugees to fall into the material support web. Charangeet Singh Kaur is one such refugee. His story, yet again, demonstrates that the waivers are not enough to adequately protect genuine refugees. Charangeet was born into a Sikh family in Punjab, India. As a youth, he joined the Babbar Khalsa Group and the Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindrawala Militant Group ("Bhindrawala Group"). 163 Babbar Khalsa was created to protect and promote the Sikh faith, while the Bhindrawala Group was created to fight for and protect religious and political cause of Sikh community. 164 After what the BBC called "one of the most momentous events in modern Indian history-the storming of the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the holiest shrine of the Sikh religion, by the Indian army" 165 -Charangeet joined several Sikh organizations, along with thousands of Sikh young men both in India and abroad. As one Sikh-American recalls:
I was 13 years old at that time in the United States and remember the rallying of Sikhs in America to help in any way possible. I recall my parents crying like children, demonstrating in front of the United Nations and Indian Consulate in NYC. . . . I remember my Sikh friends joining the cause in Washington DC . . . I remember the forming of Khalistan organizations and meeting leaders of the movement. It is most horrific [sic] period in India's modern time that unfortunately the world really is not aware of. It was a period that was responsible for changing the perception of Sikhs. Before this time people would make sure they sat their families next to Sikhs on the trains and buses of India for safety. After this period they sat as far away from them as possible and questioned if they were terrorists. 166 Despite the widespread violence aimed at Sikhs, the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs concluded that, for the purposes of asylum, the Indian government did not "persecute" Sikhs for mere affiliation with an organization. 167 To conclude otherwise would open the floodgates to Sikh asylum seekers. Instead, the government found "persecution" only where the asylum applicants could show that the police targeted them for their involvement in specific violent acts. 168 To meet this standard, however, an applicant such as Charangeet signals his or her own inadmissibility under the material support bar. Indeed, Charangeet disclosed in an affidavit supporting his asylum application that the police began to target him because, in addition to participating in demonstrations and organizational activities of the group, he assisted the freedom fighters by giving shelter to those militants who physically moved weapons from village to village. 169 In a subsequent affidavit, he further explained that, as a member of the group, he "was expected to make charitable contributions to the community, including 'provision of food and assistance to the poor.' " 170 Charangeet testified,
We-I used to help by putting that tent and organize the mondo or the tent . . . . I never kept any weapons. Those Sikhs who were baptized, they used to come and they knew that I am also baptized and I just help them with the-giving them food.
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The Third Circuit was unmoved by the fact that Charangeet had never participated in any violence and that the meetings at which he sheltered militants were for the purpose of religious ceremony. The court denied his admission under the material support bar. 172 Today, despite the Secretary's exercise of his waiver authority, a court would still likely deny admission to Charangeet (like San Kwye and Choub) for material support reasons. In its decision, the Third Circuit demonstrated some hesitancy in articulating to which organizational tier Charangeet had provided support. 173 However, a court today would easily hold that any of the Sikh groups that Charangeet participated in was "a group of two or more individuals" 174 with intent to threaten or "endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property" 175 and, hence, would be considered a Tier III terrorist organization under the INA.
Since none of Charangeet's groups are on the group-exemption list, his only potential waiver is through a duress exemption. Yet, duress is a flexible concept vulnerable to the subjectivity of the individual adjudicator. The February pronouncement 176 does not define duress, although it does provide factors to help the USCIS officers make a determination. Black's Law Dictionary lists three definitions for duress. 177 The first and third 178 definitions derive from tort and criminal law, respectively. However, the second definition has a broader applicability "a threat of harm made to compel a person to do something against his or her own will or judgment." 179 According to this definition, Charangeet could have experienced duress as a result of the continual threat of violence by the government. This threat may have, in turn, compelled him to support Sikh groups. While this is unlikely the kind of "duress" contemplated by the Exercise of Authority, the language of the pronouncement does not exclude this interpretation.
The waiver requires that the duress be the catalyst for the provision of material support to the terrorist organization but not that the terrorist organization necessarily be the source of the duress. 180 Another entity, such as a government or militia, could be the source of the threat of harm driving the individual's belief that it is necessary to support a group that works against the threat of harm.
Charangeet might argue that he joined Sikh groups because of the great threat of harm Sikhs experienced around the time of the 1984 government attack on the most important Sikh holy site. As Charangeet explained in testimony through an interpreter, "When the Indian troops attacked the holy shrine of the Sikh community (the Golden Temple), killing members of the Sant Jarnail group, he, among others joined Babbar Khalsa." plicant to first try to relocate to another state in India. In addition, his awareness of the "terrorist" organization's activities might be another detrimental factor.
The duress exemption's breath is potentially beneficial for refugees but the discretion of the USCIS factors coupled with the underlying policy of the material support provision make the waiver an empty vessel. These cases demonstrate that the waiver system is applied arbitrarily because it fails to take account of the context of the individual refugees' support, and that the material support provision will continue to dictate the fate of these refugees.
CONCLUSION: THE PROMISE OF PROTECTION
Today, even with the new waivers in place, not all bona fide refugees and asylum seekers will be protected. Colombian refugees who are the most frequently represented nationality with cases on hold for material support reasons are not on the list, nor are refugees from India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines, the next biggest groups affected by the material support bar. 191 Their chances of accessing the general waiver are slim, given the role and expanse of the discretionary factors.
The waivers are yet another illusory promise made by the United States government for the sake of appearance. In reality, they provide the United States government with another tool for making cruel distinctions that keep genuine refugees from being granted status or sanctuary. Only a legislative fix that addresses the indiscriminate nature of the material support issue will disentangle refugees from the web.
